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INTRODUCTION

Harry the Handyman ("Harry") enters into a verbal contract with
Roofs Are Us ("Roofs") for the purchase of roofing materials. At no
point are interest charges discussed, and the purchase agreement is
never reduced to writing. Harry merely agrees to pay pursuant to the
terms provided on the outstanding invoices. More importantly, Harry
never agrees to pay interest, and the invoices do not address the payment of interest. However, after Harry becomes delinquent in his
payments, Roofs charges Harry eighteen percent per annum interest
on his outstanding balance. If Harry makes interest payments to
Roofs, is Roofs liable to Harry for statutory usury, for common law
usury, or both statutory and common law usury? Moreover, if Roofs
is liable to Harry for usury, can Roofs take any remedial action to
prevent any or all of its liability, or will any remedial action alert
Harry that other possible claims exist?1 Until recently, Roofs could
be held liable for either statutory usury or common law usury. However, the Texas Legislature recently amended the general usury stat-

1. Other claims may include fraud, misrepresentation, Deceptive Trade Practices
Act violations, and the like.
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ute2 by enacting a cure provision.3 The cure provision allows creditors
to escape statutory liability penalties for charging usurious interest.4
2. In a brief background prepared for a house bill analysis, the Texas House of
Representative's Committee on Investments & Banking states, "The [Texas] Legislature is authorized by the [Texas] Constitution to regulate loans, define interest, and fix
maximum rate [sic] of interest. Pursuant to this authority, the Legislature enacted the
[Texas Consumer Credit] Code, which is the principal usury statute in Texas ....
HousE COMM. ON INVEST. & BANKING, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 2005, 73d Leg.,
R.S., 2 (1993). The bill analysis explains that
The Texas [Consumer] Credit Code is complex and extremely difficult to
understand. The Code is amended by the Legislature virtually every time it
meets, whether in regular or special session. Amendments typically utilize
odd numbering systems and inconsistent terminology. Unlike the law in
most state [sic] where usury is strictly a statutory creature, Texas law addresses usury ceilings both by statute and by the Texas Constitution.
Id. at 1.
3. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(4) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
4. See id. Following is the text of article 5069-1.06(4):
(4)(A) A person has no liability to an obligor for a violation of this Subtitle
if:
(i) within 60 days after the date the person actually discovered the violation the person corrects the violation as to the obligor by taking whatever
actions and by making whatever adjustments are necessary to correct the
violation, including the payment of interest on a refund, if any, at the applicable rate provided for in the contract of the parties; and
(ii) the person gives written notice to the obligor of the violation before
the obligor has given written notice of or has filed an action alleging the
violation of this Subtitle.
(B) For the purposes of this section, the term "actually discovered" may not
be construed, interpreted, or applied in a manner that refers to the time or
date when, through reasonable diligence, an ordinarily prudent person could
or should have discovered or known as a matter of law or fact of the violation in question, but the term shall be construed, interpreted, and applied to
refer to the time of the discovery of the violation in fact. However, the actual discovery of a violation in one transaction may constitute actual discovery of the same violation in other transactions if the violation actually
discovered is of such a nature that it would necessarily be repeated and
would be clearly apparent in the other transactions without the necessity of
examining all the other transactions. For purposes of this Section the giving
of written notice shall be accomplished by and on the delivery of the notice
to the person to whom the notice is directed or to the person's duly authorized agent or attorney of record. The delivery shall be made in person or by
United States mail to the address shown on the most recent documents in
the transaction. Deposit of the notice as registered or certified mail in a
postage paid, properly addressed wrapper in a post office or official depository under the care and custody of the United States Postal Service constitutes prima facie evidence of the delivery of the notice to the person.
(C) A person has no liability to an obligor for a violation of this Subtitle if:
(i) before March 1, 1994, the person corrects the violation as to the obligor
by taking whatever actions and by making whatever adjustments are necessary to correct the violation, including the payment of interest on a refund, if
any, at the applicable rate provided for in the contract of the parties; and
(ii) the person gives written notice to the obligor of the correction before
the obligor has given written notice of or has filed an action alleging the
violation of this Subtitle.
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Usury is defined as "interest in excess of the amount allowed by
law." 5 Therefore, usurious interest is interest exceeding the allowable
legal amount. Charging usurious interest gives a debtor a statutory
cause of action against a creditor. However, the new cure provision
may affect what was once a debtor's guaranteed recovery against a
creditor charging usurious interest:
Roofs may thus avoid statutory usury liability by utilizing the new
cure provision.' But, the question remains whether the cure provision will likewise absolve Roofs of liability for common law usury.
Furthermore, if the statutory cure does not eliminate Roofs' common
law liability, Roofs' remedial action of notifying and correcting the
excessive interest charges may alert Harry of his potential common
law usury claim against Roofs. Thus, a dilemma is created for creditors. A creditor, attempting to absolve himself of statutory usury,
must notify a debtor to correct the overcharge. Yet, the cure provision's statutory notification requirement may alert the debtor that the
creditor is liable for common law usury.
While the new statutory cure provision was intended to encourage
creditors to voluntarily cure interest overcharges, it may actually have
the unintended effect of encouraging creditors not to cure interest
overcharges. The problem arises because Texas recognizes common
law usury and statutory usury as independent causes of action.7 The
newly-appended usury cure provision, however, applies only to statutory usury.8 Given the fact that the Texas Supreme Court holds common law usury and statutory usury are independent causes of actions,9
it appears that a debtor may still bring a common law usury action
against a creditor even if the creditor has cured pursuant to the statu-

(D) A person has no civil liability to an obligor and no criminal liability for a
violation of this Subtitle resulting solely from contracting for, charging, or
receiving the interest provided in Article 1.03 of this Subtitle prior to the
30th day after the debt is due and payable.
(5) The action of a person who corrects a violation of this Subtitle as provided by Section (4) of this Article is effective as to all persons in the same
transaction, and those persons are entitled to the same protection as that
provided in Section (4) of this Article to the person who makes the
correction.
Id.

5. See TEX.
6. See TEx.

REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.

art. 5069-1.01(d) (Vernon 1987).

CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(4) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
7. See Danziger v. San Jacinto Sav. Ass'n, 732 S.W.2d 300, 304 (Tex. 1987); see
also infra Part II.
8. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(4) (Vernon Supp. 1996). The
statute specifically states, "A person has no liability to an obligor for a violation of
this subtitle" and lists the steps a creditor must take to absolve himself from liability.
Id. (emphasis added).
9. See Danziger, 732 S.W.2d at 304.
REV.
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tory provision. If so, is the debtor limited to the traditional common
law recovery?1°
This comment examines the cure provision of the Texas usury statute and discusses its effect on a plaintiff's recovery for common law
usury. Part I discusses the historical background of usury laws and
Texas usury statutes. Part II explains that the Texas Supreme Court
has adjudicated common law and statutory usury actions and has concluded that Texas courts may allow both actions independently. Part
III examines the new statutory cure provision. Part IV analyzes the
questions that arise in applying the statutory usury cure remedy. Finally, the author concludes the statutory cure provision should not apply to a common law usury cause of action.
I.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF USURY

Usury law is not a recent advent arising from modern consumer
protection concerns enacted in derogation of the traditional principal
of caveat emptor. 1 Rather, usury laws date back to the Code 3of Ham2
and New Testaments.1

murabi' in 3000 B.C. and to the Old
While modern usury law regulates the charging of excessive interest
rates, early usury law, as established in Leviticus, prohibited charging
any interest on debts.'" While contemplating and allowing the charging of interest, the Code of Hammurabi imposed a stringent penalty
for usury law violations. 5 If a creditor used fraud or deception to
collect an illegal rate of interest, he was stripped of all rights to repayment and the debtor's entire debt was voided. 6
In 1545, England became the first European country to establish7
usury laws, which legalized and regulated the taking of interest.'
Although "England repealed its usury laws in 1854, the English experience had already set the standard of interest regulation followed by
10. In Bexar Building & Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 145 S.W. 227 (Tex. 1890), the
Texas Supreme Court first allowed a debtor to merely recover interest paid in excess
of the permitted rate as an equitable recovery and quoted various early treatises in
fashioning its common law remedy.
11. Caveat emptor means "Let the buyer beware. This maxim summarizes the
rule that a purchaser must examine, judge, and test for himself." BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY 222 (6th ed. 1990).
12. The Code of Hammurabi fixed the maximum rate of interest on loans and
required the presence of an official and one witness in executing all loans. See S.
HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 17-31 (1963).

13. See Exodus 22:25; Deuteronomy 23:19-20; Nehemiah 5:7; Proverbs 28:3; Leviticus 25:36; Matthew 25:14-30; Luke 19:11-27.
14. See Leviticus 25:36 (The Law of Moses was, "Do not take interest of any kind
from [your countryman] . . .so that your countryman may continue to live among

you.").
15. See HOMER, supra note 12, at 15-33.

16. See id.
17. See generally Jerret C. Oeltjen, Usury: Utilitarianor Useless?, 3 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 167, 171-80 (1975).
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the American colonies .... ."1 8 With England's usury laws providing a
foundation, the American colonies adopted laws defining and restricting the amount of allowable interest1 9 and began molding the current
usury laws.20
II.

COMMON LAW USURY AND STATUTORY USURY
INDEPENDENT CAUSES OF

A.

ACTION

ARE

IN TEXAS

Statutory Usury

Texas defines usury as interest exceeding the legal allowable
amount. 21 Texas's first usury statute was enacted in 1840 and authorized a twelve percent per annum maximum conventional rate of interest.22 Contracts with interest rates exceeding twelve percent were
void, although a creditor was permitted to recover the value of the
goods sold to the debtor or the principal amount of the loan.2 3 Thus,
the first Texas usury statute guaranteed a debtor could recover interest paid to a creditor, while the creditor could retain the principal.
However, in the mid-19th century, restrictions on interest rates
were the topic of increased debate in business and political circles.2 4
Proponents of free enterprise argued against governmental intervention in the money market. They contended that although interest
rate restrictions were intended to aid the poor in obtaining loans,2 6 the
restrictions effectively created a shortage of capital.2 7 Furthermore,
they argued, because the source of credit was diminishing, the interest
rate restrictions actually operated to exclude the poor from obtaining
loans.28 These Texas free-enterprise proponents thus convinced Texas
18. Steven W. Bender, Rate Regulation at the Crossroads of Usury and Unconscionability: The Case for Regulating Abusive Commercial and Consumer Interest Rates
Under the UnconscionabilityStandard, 31 Hous. L. REV. 721, 726 (1994) (footnote

omitted).
19. See id.

20. For a brief description of American usury laws and a history of its development see Bender, supra note 18, at 726-28.
21. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(d) (Vernon 1987).
22. See Paschal's Dig. arts. 3941, 3942; Hart. Dig. art. 1609.
23. Paschal's Dig. art. 3942. The statute stated:
All contracts or instruments of writing whatsoever, which may, in any way,
directly or indirectly, violate the foregoing provisions of this act, by stipulating for allowing or receiving a greater premium or rate of interest than
twelve per centum per annum, for the loan, payment, or delivery of any
money, goods, wares, merchandise, bonds, notes of hand, or any commodity,
shall be void and of no effect for the whole premium or rate of interest only;
but the principal sum of money, or the value of the goods, wares, merchandise, bonds, notes of hand or commodity, may be received and recovered.
Id.
24. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993).
25.
26.
27.
28.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
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lawmakers to abolish all existing usury laws and to forbid any future
usury law enactment.2 9

The sweeping repeal of usury laws, however, resulted in massive
credit abuses that within less than a decade compelled Texas to be-

come, once again, usury-conscious.

30

Thus, in 1876, the people of

Texas adopted a constitutional amendment deeming any interest

charged above the rate of twelve percent per annum usurious and,
furthermore, interest charged in excess of eight percent per annum "in
the absence of any contract as to the rate of interest" was illegal.31
But, the constitutional amendment'did not provide a remedy for debtors who had paid usurious interest. Therefore, Texas courts fashioned
remedies for debtors injured by the payment of excessive interest.32
Almost immediately after passage of the 1876 constitutional amend-

ment, the Texas Legislature began enacting statutes implementing the

constitutional mandate fixing maximum rates of interest. 33 While var-

ious subsequent constitutional amendments and usury statutes
changed the permissible interest rate ceilings, the substance of the
29. See TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. XII, § 44. Section 44 provided:
All usury laws are abolished in this State, and the Legislature is forbidden
from making laws limiting the parties to contracts in the amount of interest
they may agree upon for loans of money or other property: Provided, this
section is not intended to change the provisions of law fixing rate of interest
in contracts, where the rate of interest is not specified.
Id.
30. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993).
31. Id. In particular, section 11 of the 1876 Texas Constitution provided:
"The legal rate of interest shall not exceed eight per cent. per annum, in
the absence of any contract as to the rate of interest; and by contract parties
may agree upon any rate not to exceed twelve per cent. per annum. All
interest charged above this last named rate, shall be deemed usurious, and
the Legislature shall, at its first session, provide appropriate pains and penalties to prevent and punish usury."
Id.
32. See Bexar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 145 S.W. 227 (Tex. 1890) (holding
the creditor should be entitled to recover the loan amount and twelve percent per
annum interest, the allowable rate, and the debtor should receive credit for amounts
she actually paid, although the contract required interest from her at "about 14 1/2
per cent").
33. Act approved Aug. 21, 1876, 15th Leg., R.S., ch. 45, §§ 2, 3, 1876 TEX. GEN.
LAWS 228, reprinted in 8 H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1873-1879, at 1064
(Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898) and Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. arts. 2978, 2979 (1879)
(interest on written contracts not to exceed 12% per annum; written contracts agreeing to a greater rate of interest void and of no effect for the whole rate of interest
only); Act approved April 11, 1892, 22d Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 6, § 21, 1892 TEX. GEN.
LAWS 4, reprintedin 10 H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1889-1897, at 368 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898); Usury-Prescribing Pains and Penalties for Collection of
Act approved April 18, 1907, 30th Leg., R.S., ch. 143, § 3, 1907 TEX. GEN. LAWS 27778, reprintedin 13 H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1906-1907, at 277 (Austin,
Gammel Book Co. 1898) (allowing double recovery of the amount of usurious interest received or collected pursuant to a written contract). See generally Allee v.
Benser, 799 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1988) (providing a succinct history of Texas statutory and
constitutional urury provisions).
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constitutional and statutory provisions "remained substantially the
same, ultimately being codified as articles 5071 and 5073 of the Revised Statutes of 1925." 3 4 Then, in 1967, the Sixtieth Texas Legislature
enacted the genesis of Texas's current general usury statute: Title 79,
Chapter One of the Texas Credit Code.3 5 Texas lawmakers followed
the rationale that: (1) credit lending is essential and vital to Texas's
economy, (2) credit lending should be regulated, (3) no effective regulation existed, and (4) lack of regulation leads to creditors victimizing
debtors.3 6 Consequently, the legislature, in article 5069 of the Texas
Revised Civil Statutes ("article 5069"), set a maximum legal interest
rate of ten percent per annum, unless otherwise authorized by law,37
and established a legal rate of six percent per annum for all accounts
and contracts that contained no agreed upon rate of interest.38 Furthermore, to protect debtors and to curtail abusive credit practices,
the Sixtieth Legislature expanded the definition of a creditor, and article 5069 first codified a penalty provision for usury 39 thereby subjecting creditors to statutory penalties." The legislature defined a
creditor as anyone that "contracts for, charges or receives interest...
authorized by this Subtitle."' 1 Thus, for the first time, Texas usurious
creditors faced severe penalties, especially for egregious violations. 2
For instance, pursuant to section 1.06(1) of article 5069, a usury violation subjected a creditor to forfeiture of twice the total interest contemplated, not merely twice the interest overcharge, plus reasonable
attorneys' fees. 4 3 An egregious violation, such as, when total contemplated interest doubled the legal rate, subjected the creditor not only
to all penalties contained in section 1.06(1), but also to forfeiture of all
principal, interest, and other charges.""
In 1979, the Sixty-sixth Texas Legislature modified the penalty portion of section 1.06, by increasing the penalty from two times the total
34. Allee, 779 S.W.2d at 63 (synopsizing the constitutional and statutory framework of Texas usury laws) (citing TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5071, 5073 (1925)
(repealed 1967).
35. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01-.07 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1997).
Title 79, Interest, art. 5069-1.01-.14 Declaration of Legislative Intent, § 1 (Vernon
1987).
36. See Chapter 274, H.B. No. 452, § 1. Additional protection became available
for consumers with the creation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act in 1977.
37. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02 (Vernon 1987).
38. Id. § 1.03.
39. See id.
40. See id. 1.06(1)-(2).
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. Acts 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 274, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 608, 610 (amended
1979) (current version at TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon
1987)).
44. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(2). In addition to the civil penalties, 1.06(2) makes the charging of usurious interest in excess of double the maximum rate a misdemeanor. See id.
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contemplated amount of interest to three times the amount exceeding
the usury limit,45 plus reasonable attorneys' fees.46 Furthermore, in
cases where this new calculation would bring a debtor only a small

recovery, the legislature provided a minimum recovery of $2,000 or
twenty percent of the principal, whichever was less.47 This provision
was specifically intended to deter small loan creditors from charging
high interest rates.4 8 The legislature also made the six percent default

rate, utilized in the absence of a specified interest rate, applicable to
all open accounts, and the interest was to "commenc[e] on the thirti-

eth (30th) day from and after the time when the sum [was] due and
payable."49 However, creditors committing accidental and bona fide
errors are relieved from usury liability.50 Thus, creditors committing
clerical errors use-section 1.06(1) as a defense to a usury charge.51
Whether a creditor is subject to a statutory penalty depends on
whether a debtor can prove all the elements of a cause of action for
usury, which include proving the creditor charged him "an exaction of
a greater compensation than allowed by law for use of the money by
45.

COMMITrEE ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, BILL ANALYSIS,

Tex. H.B. 616, 66th

Leg., R.S. 2 (1979). The Legislative history for this amendment has disappeared from
the Archives Division of the State Library in Austin. In a telephone interview with
Gene Carefoot of the Archives Division, the legislative history for House Bill No.
616, which was enacted as art. 5069-1.06(1)-(3), was last requested in 1985, and despite an extensive search performed by Ms. Carefoot and her associates, the legislative history information was not found. Ms. Carefoot's conclusion was that the
documents were either missing or misfiled. Thus, it is difficult to surmise the true
legislative intent regarding this amendment. Telephone Interview with Gene
Carefoot, Coordinator, Access and Outreach Projects, Archives Division of the State
Library (June 12, 1996). See also James A. Pikl, Usury Law and Guarantor: A TexasSized Loophole, 13 REV. LITIG. 31, n.17 (1993) (verifying the missing legislative history of this amendment by a professional research firm).
46. See Acts 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 274, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 608, 610
(amended 1979) (current version at TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1)
(Vernon 1987)).
47. See id. (providing further that "in no event shall the amount forfeited be less
than two thousand dollars or twenty percent of the principal, whichever is the smaller
sum").
48. See COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 616,
66th Leg., R.S., 2 (1979).
49. TEX. REV. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1987). See Manuel H.
Newburger, Acceleration Notices and Demand Letters, 47 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP.
338, 341 (1993). Newburger states that:
On open accounts for which there is no written agreement to pay interest, it
cannot be charged until thirty days after the date the invoice is due. Any
attempt to charge interest during the thirty days from the date of the invoice
to the invoice's due date will be an act of usury and, because no interest
could be charged during that time period, will in fact be an act of double
usury.
Id. at 341 (citations omitted).
50. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon 1987).
51. See Mayfield v. San Jacinto Sav. Ass'n, 788 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (finding that lender's transposition of numbers between
the note and a disbursement check was a clerical type error absolving the lender of
liability).
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the debtor."5 2 The statute defines usurious interest as interest that is
greater than that allowed by statute 53 or interest "which is in excess of
double the amount of interest allowed by this Subtitle[.]. ' '54 Additionally, a debtor must bring a statutory action for usury within four years
from when the creditor "received or collected"55 the usurious interest.
B.

Common Law Usury

Article 16, section 11 of the current Texas Constitution grants authority to the Texas Legislature to fix the maximum legal rates of interest.5 6 Absent such legislation, however, the Constitution mandates
that a maximum default rate of ten percent per annum applies to contracts with agreed upon interest rates. 5 7 Furthermore, section 11 provides that a maximum default rate of six percent per annum applies to
contracts containing no agreed upon interest rate.5 8
Nonetheless, when legislators amended the Texas Constitution in
1876, they included no provision allowing debtors to recover damages
in the event they paid usurious interest.5 9 The amendment only made
it unlawful for a creditor to charge interest above twelve percent per
annum. 60 Thus, in 1890, the Texas Supreme Court, in Bexar Building
& Loan Ass'n v. Robinson,6 1 created a common law remedy for debtors voluntarily paying usurious interest. 62 In Bexar Building, the court
52. Holley v. Watts, 629 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1982) ("The essential elements of a
usurious transaction are: .(1) a loan of money; (2) an absolute obligation that the
principle be repaid; and (3) the exaction of a greater compensation than allowed by
law for the use of money by the debtor.").
53. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon 1987).
54. Id. § 1.06(2). In addition to the penalty set forth in article 5069-1.06(1), article
5069-1.06(2) penalizes a violator through forfeiture of all principal "as well as interest
and all other charges [the violator] and shall pay reasonable attorney fees set by the
court." Id. Article 5069-1.06(2) also sets forth a criminal penalty for such violation: a
misdemeanor with assessment of a fine of not more than $1,000. See id.
55. Id. § 1.06(3).
56. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11. The constitutional provision provides:
The Legislature shall have authority to classify loans and lenders, license and
regulate lenders, define interest and fix maximum rates of interest; provided,
however, in the absence of legislation fixing maximum rates of interest all
contracts for a greater rate of interest than ten per centum (10%) per annum
shall be deemed usurious; provided, further, that in contracts where no rate
of interest is agreed upon, the rate shall not exceed six per centum (6%) per
annum. Should any regulatory agency, acting under the provisions of this
Section, cancel or refuse to grant any permit under any law passed by the
Legislature; then such applicant or holder shall have the right of appeal to
the courts and granted a trial de novo as that term is used in appealing from
the justice of peace court to the county court.
Id.
57. See id.
58. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1.06(1)-(2).
59. See Bexar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 14 S.W. 227, 227-28 (Tex. 1890).
60. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11.
61. 14 S.W. 227 (Tex. 1890).
62. See id. at 228.
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declared that it would function as a court of equity and "interfere" in
the transaction between the complaining debtor and the creditor but
only to the extent that it allowed the debtor to recover usurious interest 6 3 but required the debtor to pay the principal. The court held that
even though Texas's usury statute simply maintained a usurious contract void and did not specifically provide a remedy for an injured
debtor to recover excessive amounts paid, the debtor was not foreclosed from a "common-law
or equitable right to recover, by affirma64
tive action, such interest.,
In Commercial Credit Equipment Corp. v. West,65 the Amarillo
Court of Appeals revisited the issue of whether a usury statute preempted all common law causes of action for usury. The Commercial
Creditcourt held that both statutory and common law causes of action
are actionable if pleaded.6 6 In Commercial Credit, a debtor sued a
creditor, alleging the creditor violated the usury statute.6 7 In addition,
the debtor asserted a common law usury cause of action.6 8 The Commercial Credit court relied on Bexar Building for the proposition that
both the statutory and the common law actions were independently
valid.6 9 Specifically, the Commercial Credit court stated, "We find
nothing in . . . article 5069-1.06 that expresses a clear intent by the
legislature to overturn the long-established common law action pronounced in [Bexar Building] for the recovery of usurious interest
paid."7 ° The court further stated,
Courts, do not, however, favor repeals of settled principles by implication, and the legislature in the enactment of a statute will not be
presumed to intend to overturn long-established legal principles,
unless such intention is made clearly to appear by express declarations or by necessary implication. To the contrary, the legislature
will be presumed not to intend to overturn long-establishedprinciples
of law, and the statute will be so construed, unless an intention to do
so plainly appearsby express declaration or necessary or unmistakable implication, and the
language employed admits of no other rea71
sonable construction.
Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court in Danziger v. San Jacinto Savings Ass'n,72 held that common law usury and statutory usury are in63. See id.
64. Id.
65. 677 S.W.2d 669, 679 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
66. See id. at 679 (holding the usury statute did not overturn or repeal the common law action for recovery of usurious interest).
67.
68.
69.
70.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.

71. Id. (quoting Flannery v. Bishop, 504 P.2d 778, 781 (Wash. 1972)) (emphasis
added).
72. 732 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1987). In Danziger, the creditor placed the principal
amount of a home improvement loan in an escrow account to be disbursed by the
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dependent causes of action. 73 The Danziger court expressly held a
debtor could sue for both common law usury and statutory usury.74
The court specifically referred to Commercial Credit and other lower

court decisions stating that the plaintiffs had "properly pleaded their
common law claim and preserved it on appeal; therefore, they are entitled to recover all interest paid. '75 In sum, the Danziger court held

that if both actions are initially pleaded in a case, then both actions
are valid. 76 The Texas Supreme Court has emphasized, however, that
a common law cause of action not properly pleaded will not be sustained, and the injured debtor may not recover common law damages.77 For instance, in Allee v. Benser,78 the Texas Supreme Court
held that a common law cause of action for usury could not be sustained because it had not been properly pleaded. 79 However, the Allee court expressly stated that it was not precluding the plaintiff from
asserting a common law cause of action for usury on remand.80
C.

Common Law Remedy for Statutory Usury

Bexar Building established a remedy for debtors voluntarily paying

usurious interest rates.8 1 Under the rule established in Bexar Building, a debtor's damages are calculated as the difference between the

actual payments of interest made to the creditor and the interest that

would have been due had the maximum legal amount been paid.8"
The Bexar Building decision made Texas one of the first states to alcreditor directly to the contractor as work progressed on the improvements. See id. at
302. The debtor was charged interest on the total loan amount during the time the
construction was in progress. See id. "At the end of the disbursements, when [the
creditor] could calculate how much money had been retained in the escrow account
during each payment period, [the creditor] provided a ',manual" (handwritten) credit
to the account to return interest charged on the money prior to its being disbursed."
Id. (emphasis added). The Texas Supreme Court held it was illegal for a lender to
charge interest on the total principal amount of the note when the loan is disbursed
intermittently and then credit back the overcharge once the entire principal amount is
disbursed. See id.
73. See id. at 305.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 304.
76. See id.
77. 779 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1988).
78. See id. In Allee, the assignees of a subordinate lienholder brought a cause of
action against the superior lienholder for a declaration that the senior transaction was
usurious as a matter of law and that the subordinate lienholder had standing to assert
the usury claim. See id. The Texas Supreme Court concluded that the subordinate
lienholder lacked "standing to assert the penalty provisions of the usury statutes
against the senior lienholder," but would not decide whether the subordinate
lienholder had standing to assert a common law cause of action against the superior
lienholder because "[t]he present state of the [subordinate lienholder's] pleadings
would not allow such a remedy .... " Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See Bexar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 14 S.W. 227, 228 (Tex. 1890).
82. See id.
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low a debtor to institute an action for restitution to recover usurious
interest paid to a creditor.8 3 The Bexar Building court surveyed other
states' usury statutes, including those of Missouri, Iowa, Maryland,
and Georgia, and found that none permitted a debtor to sue for damages due to "some peculiar policy or language of the statute." 4 The
Bexar Building court distinguished these state decisions as not in accord with equitable doctrines and fashioned an equitable remedy. 5
The court, quoting several early treatises, stated:
Equity... will never assist a party to carry into effect his own intentional violation of the law. It is well settled that courts of equity will
go further, and give all the affirmative relief which is just to the
debtor .... If the contract is executed, he may recover back the
usurious amount paid in excess of the sum actually borrowed, and
legal interest thereon.... Such contracts being declared void by the
statute against86usury, equity will follow the law in the construction
of the statute.
At the date of the Bexar Building decision, the Texas usury statute
provided that a contract with an interest rate greater than twelve percent per annum would be void.8 7 In its analysis, the Bexar Building
court could find nothing in the Texas statute to indicate that the legislature intended to destroy a debtor's right to file a common law cause
of action to recover interest overcharges.8 8 Thus, the court allowed
the debtor
to receive restitution of the interest paid above the legal
limit.8 9
Thus, as long as both the common law usury action and the statutory usury action are properly pleaded, 90 Texas will recognize both
causes of action. However, Texas law also prohibits a debtor from
receiving a double recovery. 91 In attempting to harmonize these concepts, Texas appellate courts have fashioned confusing and conflicting
remedies.
83. See id. at 227-28.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 228.

86. Id. (referring to the disclaimed notion that if an individual contracted to pay
usurious interest he should not be granted equity if no compulsion was used by the
creditor) (footnotes omitted).
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.

90. See generally Allee v. Benser, 779 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1988) (disallowing a common law remedy for usury when not properly pleaded, but not precluding the plaintiff
from asserting on remand a common law cause of action); First State Bank of Bedford
v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978) (holding a properly pleaded common law claim
for usury is the fundamental requirement for recovery).
91. See Coppedge v. Colonial Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 721 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Vick v. George, 671 S.W.2d 541, 551 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 686 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984)).
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For example, the Commercial Credit court, while holding common
law usury actions are independent from statutory usury actions,
treated the remedies as cumulative, allowing the debtors to recover
for common law usury but also exacting the statutory penalty.92 In
fact, the court supplemented the statutory penalties of "forfeiture of
three times the amount of usurious interest contractedfor, charged or
received"9' 3 with the common law remedy of restitution of the amount
of interest paid above the authorized legal rate.94 In assessing the
statutory penalties, the court reasoned that allowing Commercial
Credit to retain interest up to the maximum legal amount allowed the
creditor to benefit "from its unlawful action and effectively escape[]
from the triple damages provision of the statute." 95 Thus, the court
ruled that the common law remedy should not be limited solely to
restitution of excess interest paid beyond the legal rate. 96
In Coppedge v. Colonial Savings & Loan Ass'n,97 the court agreed
that the common law and statutory causes of action are independent,
noting "that when the legislature creates a cause of action and a remedy for its enforcement, that legislation is regarded as cumulative of
the common-law cause of action and remedy, unless the statute expressly or by implication negatives the latter." 98 However, the court
ruled a debtor was entitled to recovery under either the common law
or the statute but not both. 99 Thus, although the debtors pleaded
both statutory and common law actions, the court reasoned the debtors were only entitled to the common law remedy because the
debtor's damages were the "result of one loss, viz., the usurious interest charged and received by [the creditor]. 1 00 Therefore, the court
held that the debtors were not entitled to recover under the alternative statutory cause of action.01 The Coppedge court, affirming the
trial court's judgment of recovery under a common law usury cause of
action, held that where alternative remedies exist, the aggrieved party
is entitled to only a single recovery. 1 2
92. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v. West, 677 S.W.2d 669, 680 (Tex. App.Amarillo 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
93. See id.

94. See id. at 679.
95. Id. at 680.
96. See id.
97. 721 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
98. Id. at 938 (citing Juneman v. Franklin, 3 S.W. 562, 563 (Tex. 1887) (emphasis
added).

99. See id. at 939.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 939 (citing Vick v. George, 671 S.W.2d 541, 551 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 686 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984)) ("It is well established that an aggrieved party is entitled to only one recovery for the same loss, even
when alternative remedies exist.").
102. See Coppedge, 721 S.W.2d at 939.
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Finally, in Danziger v. San Jacinto Savings Ass'n, 1°3 the Texas
Supreme Court ruled that a debtor pleading a common law action is
entitled to recover all interest as well as statutory penalties. 10 4 In
Danziger, the court also extinguished the requirement that a debtor
must pay usurious interest in order to proceed with a common law
cause of action against a creditor charging usurious interest. The court
found the unilateral act of charging excessive interest occurs when a
creditor enters a usurious amount on a statement, an invoice, a letter,
a ledger sheet or other document. 10 5 The court found it unnecessary
and immaterial whether the debtor actually pays the usurious amount
before he may proceed with an action, 10 6 stating, "The mere charging
of excessive interest constitutes usury."10 7 Using this framework, the
court ruled the plaintiffs were entitled to all interest paid and were
"entitled to cancellation of all interest not yet paid because '. . . as to
interest a usurious contract is unenforceable."' 10 8 The court allowed
this recovery in addition to statutory penalties since the plaintiffs had
properly pleaded and preserved both causes of action. 10 9 Thus, the
court expanded the traditional recovery for usury beyond that which
previously had been allowed. Pursuant to the Danziger decision,
Texas courts now recognize independent causes of action and recoveries for common law and statutory usury, provided each is pleaded
and properly preserved for appeal." 0
III.

THE STATUTORY CURE PROVISION

According to the House Committee on Investments and Banking,
the Texas usury statute is poorly organized and of such length and
complexity as to create "nightmares" for creditors and debtors.'
To
escape the harsh nature of Texas usury laws, large corporations have
either sought out-of-state financing for in-state projects or have
avoided undertaking major projects in Texas altogether." 2 For this
and perhaps other reasons, the Seventy-third Legislature in 1993
amended article 1.06, adding a cure provision to grant relief to credi103. 732 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1987).
104. See id.

105. See id. at 304 (citing Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe & Supply, 547 S.W.2d 260, 261
(Tex. 1977); Wright Way Spraying Serv. v. Butler, 690 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. 1985); Moore
v. Sabine Nat'l Bank of Port Arthur, 527 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (demand letters); Dryden v. City Nat'l Bank of Laredo, 666 S.W.2d
213 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (monthly statements).
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Wall v. East Tex. Teachers' Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918, 921
(Tex. 1976)) (omission in original).
109. See id.
110. See id.

111. See HOUSE COMM.
73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
112. See id.

ON INVEST.
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tors charging usurious interest. 13 In enacting. House Bill No. 2005,
legislators added subsection (4) to article 5069-1.06.114 On its face, the
amendment clearly allows a creditor to cure a statutory usury violation by "taking whatever actions . - . necessary to correct the violation," provided the remedial action is taken within sixty days from the
creditor's actual discovery of the violation.' 15 Thus, the cure provision
permits a creditor to escape statutory liability.' 11 Remedial actions
may include either refunding the interest, or correcting the charged
interest rate, or both." 7 Moreover, a creditor must give written notice
to the debtor that he violated the usury statute before the debtor informs the creditor of the violation or before the debtor has filed a
usury action against the creditor."'

IV.

THE TEXAS LEGISLATURE FAILED TO RESOLVE WHETHER

THE STATUTORY CURE PROVISION APPLICABLE TO
STATUTORY USURY CLAIMS ALSO APPLIES TO
COMMON LAW USURY CLAIMS

In spite of the legislative intention to allow creditors to cure usurious violations by utilizing the statutory cure provision, a major question remains unanswered. The cure provision addresses only the
statutory usury claims. The cure provision, however, is silent as to
whether the provision may be applied'to common law usury claims.
Since the Texas Supreme Court specifically allows both common law
and statutory claims, the unresolved issue is whether, or how, the new
statutory cure provision affects the common law usury cause of action.
Specifically, may a debtor recover on a common law usury claim after
the creditor has used the cure provision to foreclose the debtor's statutory usury claim?
In the initial hypothetical, it is undisputed that Roofs committed
usury. Roofs violated the usury statute by charging excessive interest.
By charging Harry eighteen percent per annum interest, Roofs is not
only liable to Harry for the smallest statutory penalty-three times
the usurious interest charged-but Roofs is also liable for an egregious violation and thus must forfeit all of the principal, interest, incidental charges, and required payment of attorneys' fees. Since the
parties never agreed on the amount of interest to be charged, Roofs is
limited to charging Harry a maximum interest rate of six percent interest per annum." 9 However, if Roofs discovers its usury violation
113. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(4) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
114. See id.
115. Id. 5069-1.06(4)(A)(i).
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id. § 1.06(4)(A)(ii). The statute also defines the meaning of "actually discovered," being the time of the violation discovery "in fact" and the procedure for
giving written notice and delivery. See id. § 1.06(B).
119. See id. § 1.06(4)(A)(ii).
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and acts within sixty days to cure, Roofs may correct its mistake as
prescribed by the statutory cure provision. To do so, Roofs must take
whatever means necessary and send written notice to Harry. Yet,
such written notice may alert Harry to a common law usury claim
against Roofs.
Texas courts have not addressed whether or how the statutory cure
provision applies to common law usury claims. In fact, Texas courts
have yet to interpret the statutory cure provision. Thus, the question
remains whether the statutory cure provision, if followed, will be applied to both statutory and common law usury claims. In resolving the
issue, Texas courts may literally interpret the statutory cure provision,
ascertain legislative intent from the provision's legislative history, interpret the cure provision as Texas courts have interpreted the usury
statute, or consult other states' decisions interpreting similar usury
cure provisions.
A.

Texas Legislative History, Construction, and Interpretation

Although no Texas court has interpreted the usury cure provision,
many courts have interpreted the usury statute.12 ° Thus, judicial treatment of the usury statute may shed some light on how Texas courts
will construe the cure provision. For instance, the Texas Supreme
Court's opinion in Bexar Building is evidence of how the new cure
provision might be interpreted. In construing early Texas usury statutes, the Bexar Building court held a common law cause of action for
usury was not pre-empted by the statutory usury cause of action. 12 1
The court reached this conclusion after noting the statutory usury provision lacked any eliminating language.122 Hence, the Bexar Building
court strictly construed the language of the usury statute in its analysis. 12' This strict construction of the usury statute was also followed in
FirstState Bank of Bedford v. Miller,124 Commercial Credit Equipment
Corp. v. West, 12 ' and Danziger v. San Jacinto Savings Ass'n,'126 leading

to the arguably obvious conclusion that Texas courts narrowly construe usury statutes.
In fact, since Bexar Building, Texas courts have specifically stated
that the Texas usury statute "must be narrowly construed[.] ' 1 27 The

Austin appellate court in Hardwick v. Austin Gallery of OrientalRugs,
120. See infra text accompanying notes 121-132.
121. See Bexar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 14 S.W. 227, 228 (Tex. 1890).
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. 563 S.W.2d 572, 576-77 (Tex. 1978).
125. 677 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
126. 732 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1987).
127. Hatzenbuehler v. Call, 894 S.W.2d 68, 69 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ
denied) (citing Steves Sash & Door Co. v. Ceco Corp., 751 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Tex.
1988)).
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Inc.,2 8 states that "nothing in Section 1.06(1) evidences a legislative
intention to supplant the common law remedy.

12 9

Furthermore, the

Dallas Court of Appeals in Cadle Co. v. Castle stated, "In determining
the meaning of statutory language, we read the statute as a whole and
give consideration to the entire act, its nature and object, and the consequences that would follow from a particular construction.'

130

Thus,

these Texas courts, using a strict, plain-meaning construction,' 3 1 focus
on the language, or lack thereof, in the usury statute and infer the
legislative intent from the language to determine the meaning, scope,
and purpose of the usury statute.
As previously stated, in enacting the statutory cure provision, the
Texas Legislature failed to state whether the cure provision affects
common law usury. Rules of statutory construction dictate that if the
Texas Legislature intended the cure provision to include common law

usury, it would have expressed its intention in the statute. 132 Therefore, because the plain language of the statute does not include liability for common law usury, then by its exclusion, the Texas Legislature
the cure provision to affect only statutory usury
must have intended
133
causes of action.
However, recent proposed amendments to the usury statutes in
Texas expressly include and negate a creditor's liability for common
law usury. 1 34 Companion bills in the Texas House of Representatives
and the Texas Senate were introduced in the Seventy-fourth Legislature in 1995.135 The companion bills stated:
The liability provided by ... this section is inclusive of any other
liabilities of creditors provided by common law for contracting for,
charging, or receiving conventional interest in an amount that produces a rate in excess of the maximum rate of conventional interest
fixed by this Subtitle, including any other liabilities imposed by the

128. 779 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied) (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 448.
130. Cadle Co. v. Castle, 913 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied) (citing Sayer v. Mullins, 681 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Tex. 1984)).
131. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
46.01 at'81 (5th ed. 1992).
132. See Commercial Credit, 677 S.W.2d at 679 (quoting Flannery v. Bishop, 504
P.2d 778, 781 (Wash. 1972)).
133. Expressio unis est exclusio alterius is an often quoted legal maxim meaning the

expression of one is the exclusion of others. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 299 (5th ed.
1983).
134. See Tex. S.B. 1473, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995); Tex. H.B. 3071, 74th Leg., R.S.
(1995). In a telephone conversation, Nancy Hayes of the Legislative Reference Library indicated the committee passed neither bill. Therefore, neither bill was introduced in the Senate or the House. Hence, no bill analysis is available-nor any
additional information. Telephone Interview with Nancy Hayes, Legislative Reference Library (July 12, 1996).
135. See Tex. S.B. 1473, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995); Tex. H.B. 3071, 74th Leg., R.S.
(1995).
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courts of this state to enforce Section 11, Article XVI, Texas Consti136
tution, and a creditor is not subject to those other liabilities.
The Texas Legislature's refusal to expressly enact these bills may arguably demonstrate a legislative intent to leave common law usury
outside the scope of the statutory cure provision.
As discussed in Part II, the Texas Supreme Court has allowed recovery for common law usury in addition to recovery for statutory
usury, provided the common law claim is properly pleaded and error
is preserved for appeal. 137 Furthermore, since the Texas Legislature
did not specifically include liabilities for common law usury claims
within the general usury statutes, and since courts continue to recognize common law usury claims, it may be inferred that common law
usury is not affected by the new cure provision. Therefore, creditors
who choose to implement the cure provision to avoid statutory liability may still be liable for common law usury.
The cure provision's requirement that a creditor notify a debtor to
avoid liability for statutory usury may actually serve to alert the
debtor that he has another potential cause of action against the creditor. Therefore, the creditor is placed in a "Catch-22" situation. In
order to escape statutory liability, the creditor must notify the debtor
that creditor violated the statutory usury provision. Yet, such notification may alert- the debtor that the creditor may also be liable for common law usury.
The cure provision does not specify a particular format that a creditor must follow to notify the debtor. Rather, the cure provision requires the creditor to correct his violation by whatever means
necessary within sixty days of actually discovering the violation and to
give the debtor written notification of the violation. 38 Thus, a creditor could conceivably draft the notice so that it does not state or imply
that a legal violation has occurred. Practically speaking, presently it is
impossible to notify a debtor of the interest rate correction without
seeming to send a telegram saying, "SUE ME!"
An examination of the legislative history of the cure provision and
rules governing statutory construction shows the Texas Legislature intended to allow usurious creditors to absolve themselves of, at least,
statutory liability. 139 For instance, in 1993, the Seventy-third Legislature eliminated the nearly automatic usury penalty provision of the
usury statute by including the cure provision. 40 The cure provision
was intended to put the usurious creditor in a better position by allowing him to avoid suit by an injured debtor if the creditor proac136. Tex. S.B. 1473, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995).
137. See supra Part II.
138. See supra note 4, § 4(A)(i).
139. See HousE COMM. ON INVEST. & BANKING,
73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
140. See supra note 4, § 4.
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tively remedies the debtor's injury. 1 41 The newly enacted cure

provision was modeled after the then existing cure provision found in
article 5069 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes that only applied to

specified consumer loans. 142 The new cure provision, however, applies to consumer loans in general and effectively treats all usurious

creditors equally. 43 However, the provision does not apply to all consumer loans. Specifically excluded are transactions falling outside the
delineated sections, which include sections governing consumer
loans
44
that are regulated by the Consumer Credit Commissioner.
In the House Committee Reports, the Legislature stated, "The purposes of this legislation are to allow persons who have violated Chapter One of the Credit Code to use procedures similar to those found in
Chapter Eight of the Credit Code to cure the violation and avoid lia-

bility." ' 45 Furthermore, the Legislature found that the cure provision
was the proper remedy because creditors were confused and unsure
regarding statutory liability for charging usurious interest.

46

In fact,

in bill hearings, proponents emphasized that the banking industry re-

quested such an amendment. 4 7
The proponents of the bill also sought enactment of the cure provi-

sion to effectuate certain policy goals. First, they hoped that by affording usurious creditors the ability to cure, debtors' usury lawsuits

would no longer "clog[ ] the courts.' 48 Further, the House Committee on Investments and Banking alleged that without the bill's enactment, creditors would be discouraged from acting in good faith by
notifying debtors of a mistake. 1 49 Additionally, the House Committee

contended that without the cure provision the usury statute discouraged creditors from disclosing their mistakes and decreased the incen141. See HOUSE COMM. ON INVEST. & BANKING, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 2005,
73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
142. See id. The newly enacted cure provision was modeled after the existing cure
provision in Chapter Eight of article 5069. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 50698.01(C) (Vernon 1987).
143. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01 (Vernon 1987). Subtitle One
governs written contracts and consumer loans in general. Subtitle Two, containing
chapters two through eight, governs loans under the jurisdiction of the Consumer
Credit Commission.
144. See id. 5069-2.01. Specifically, Subtitle TWo deals with Regulated Loans (chapter three), Installment Loans (chapter four), Secondary Mortgage Loans (chapter
five), Retail Installment Loans (chapter six), and Motor Vehicle Installment Sales
(chapter seven). The cure provision that governs Subtitle 2 (Sections 2.01 to 8.01) is
in Chapter Eight. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01(C) (Vernon 1987).
145. HOUSE COMM. ON INVEST. & BANKING, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 2005, 73rd
Leg., R.S. (1993).
146. See id.
147. See id.; Hearing on Tex. H.B. 2005 Before the House Comm. on Inv. & Banking, 73d Leg., R.S. (March 23, 1993) (copy on file with the author).
148. HousE COMM. ON INVEST. & BANKING, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 2005, 73d
Leg., R.S. (1993).
149. See id.
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tive to correct overcharges. 50 Thus, the Committee intended to
decrease litigation and promote creditors' good faith actions to correct
mistakes when it encouraged enactment of the cure provision.
Whether the Legislature clearly effectuated its purpose, however, remains to be seen. In fact, passage of the cure provision coupled with
the legislators' specific exclusion of common law usury causes of action,' 51 may actually produce a contrary result.

Regardless of the legislature's attempts to clarify the scope of the
statutory cure provision, Texas courts must ultimately determine the
issue. It appears clear that if the cure statute is interpreted strictly, as
courts construed the usury statutes in Bexar Building and Miller, then
the common law usury cause of action will still be allowed in spite of
the statutory cure provision.
B.

Survey of Other States

Since no Texas case law exists regarding the scope of Texas's statutory cure provision and/or its effect on a creditor's liability for common law usury, usury statutes and cure provisions of other states may
be helpful in interpreting and applying Texas law.' 52 Three other
states' statutes expressly provide a statutory cure provision for a credi150. See id.
151. See supra Part II.
152. See generally ALA. CODE § 8-8-12 (1996); ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.030 (Michie
1995); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1202 (West 1996); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916-1 (West
1996); Heald v. Friis-Hansen, 345 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1959); CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 512-103 (West 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36A-573 (West 1996); D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 26-705, 26-707, 28-3303, 28-3304 (1996); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-4-1, 7-4-2, 7-410, 7-4-18 (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 478-4, 478-5, 478-7, 478-8 (Michie 1995);
IDAHO CODE § 28-42-201 (1996); 17 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 6413 (West 1981); 815 ILL
COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/1-205/6 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-1-102 (Michie
1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.5 (West 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7105 (1995); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 360.020 (Michie 1995); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2924 (West 1996);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3501 (West Supp. 1996); Thrift Funds of Baton Rouge, Inc. v.
Jones, 274 So. 2d 150 (La. 1973); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 432 (West 1980);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47.20, 48.196, 334.03 (West 1996); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1717, 75-67-119 (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 408.060, 408.070 (West 1996); Hecker v.
Patney, 196 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946); MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-108 (1995);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-105 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 99.050 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 336:1 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 31:1-3 (West 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-813 (Michie 1996); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-513 (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 1-53, 6-25, 24-2 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-14-09 to 47-14-11 (1995); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1321.02, 1321.13, 1321.04 (Banks-Baldwin 1996); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14A, § 3-201 (West 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 82.010 (1995); 41 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 502 (West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-4 (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 54-3-7, 54-3-9, 54-11-7, 54-3-9 (Michie 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-14-114, 4714-117 (1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70B (1996), (repealed); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 70C-1-101 to -106, -201 to -203, -301 to -302 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 50
(1993); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-330.56, 6.1-330.57 (Michie 1996); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 19.52.030 (West 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 138.057 (West 1996); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40-14-101, 40-14-140, 40-14-142, 40-14-522, 40-14-523, 40-1.4-702 (Michie
1996) (illustrating the incongruous treatment of usury among individual states).
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However, these provisions differ significantly from the Texas
provision.
In Florida, for example, a penalty provision is inapplicable if a creditor notifies a debtor of a usurious charge and refunds the overcharge,
plus interest, or if the creditor is "a bona fide endorsee or transferee
of negotiable paper purchased before maturity" limited to certain exceptions.154 In Maryland, usury cannot be pleaded or claimed if a
creditor notifies the debtor and modifies the contract rate to the legal
rate within thirty days of the execution of the loan.'55 A West Virginia
creditor is not in violation of its state's statute if an innocent, bona
fide error is made and if the error is rectified within fifteen days after
the creditor's receipt of notice of a usurious contract. 56
Therefore, Texas is the only state which contains a corrective mea1 57
sure which is based on the creditor's discovery of the violation.
Thus, interpreting Texas's cure provision by examining other states'
corrective measures remains difficult due to the lack of similarity
among statutes. Nonetheless, these other states' statutory cure provisions are clearly intended to provide creditors with incentives to cure
by absolving them of all liability.
CONCLUSION

Texas holds statutory usury claims are independent of common law
usury claims. Courts further hold that each usury cause of action
neither relies on nor requires the other. Hence, Texas courts allow a
debtor to recover under the Texas usury statute regardless of whether
the debtor makes a claim for or receives a recovery from a common
law usury cause of action, provided he does not receive double
recovery.
Section 1.06(4) of article 5069 was intended to reduce creditor liability for statutory usury by allowing creditors to voluntarily correct
overcharges. The Texas Legislature, however, did not specifically include common law usury claims within the scope of the cure provision.
Strictly construed, the cure provision may only apply to statutory
usury causes of action. Thus, the legislature has left creditors in a very
precarious position because the very notification required to cure a
statutory usury claim may trigger knowledge of a common law usury
claim and could subject the creditor to severe penalties. This result
leaves creditors that rely on the statutory cure provision vulnerable to
liability if a debtor asserts a claim for common law usury. Therefore,
153. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.04 (West 1990); MD. CODE ANN., Corn. Law I § 12114 (1983); W. VA. CODE. § 47-6-6 (1995).
154. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.04 (West 1990).
155. See MD. CODE ANN., Corn. Law I § 12-114 (1983).
156. See W. VA. CODE § 47-6-6 (1995).
157. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(4)(A)(i) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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creditors who choose to follow the cure provision may still be held
liable under a common law usury cause of action.
Additionally, a debtor may even use the current status of usury laws
either defensively or offensively. From a defensive posture, if a creditor charging usurious interest were to sue a debtor for recovery of a
past-due balance without availing itself of the statutory cure provision,
a debtor could countersue for statutory and common law usury. Offensively, if this same creditor failed to avail itself of the cure provision, the debtor may be entitled to bring a usury cause of action
against the creditor at any time prior to the expiration of the four year
limitations period. 58 Thus, the creditor is left merely with a hope that
the debtor will fail to realize he may pursue a common law usury
cause of action.
In sum, the statutory usury cure provision, intended to reduce creditor liability for usury, is of questionable value because it may actually
function as notice to a debtor that his creditor broke the law. Thus,
the cure provision for the creditor is not really a cure at all, but rather
is an ailment, offering a creditor incomplete protection from lawsuits
and actually placing the creditor in a vulnerable position.
Cindy T Beal

158. See

TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.

5069-1.06(3) (Vernon 1987).
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